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FORGEDDABOUT CONFLICTS-IF CITIBAR HAS
ITS WAY, WE CAN HAVE JUST ONE BIG
LAW FIRM
Lawrence J. Fox*

I. INTRODUCTION

I once wrote a short story, The Phone Call.' In it, a female partner
of great capability at a major New York City law firn finally breaks
through yet another professional glass ceiling by receiving a request that
she handle a major transaction for an "important" new client, finally
generating her own client snaring opportunity after spending her entire
career undertaking work for the clients of others.2 Our heroine stands on
the threshold of becoming a rainmaker when she learns, to her dismay,
that another partner, this one male, though not yet contacted, expects to
be retained by the adverse party to the proposed hostile transaction.
Because of that anticipated business, he demands the firm turn away the
new representation. 4 Needless to say my protagonist is crushed, and in
response to her disappointment, the management committee of the firm
proposes that they represent both sides to the matter! That way "each
[client] will get the best representation money can buy," one of the
lawyers rationalizes the proposed solution.6 One team was to be on the
forty-third floor of the building, and the other on the forty-sixth floor.'
"And since we're all in the same building, they'll be no need for

* Partner, Drinker Biddle & Reath; Adjunct Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law
School. B.A., LL.B., University of Pennsylvania.
1. Lawrence J. Fox, The Phone Call, LMG., Fall 1996, at 8.
2. See id. at 8-9.
3. See id.
at 10-11.
4. See id. at ll.
5. See id. at 12.
6. Id.
7. See id.
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messengers or faxes.... sav[ing] thousands [for the clients]," is the way
one partner in the firm expresses his support for this clever solution!
It should then have come as no surprise to me when, just recently,
fact followed fiction as the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York ("Citibar") issued an ethics opinion concluding that a law firm was
free, with client consent, to represent both sides of a transaction.9 As the
opinion holds: "[C]lients who are fully advised of the relevant
circumstances and of the material and reasonably foreseeable ways that
the conflict could adversely affect their interests have the right to waive
the conflict in order to be represented by the lawyer of their choice."'
This opinion is the culmination of a campaign that has been led by
the same major New York firms-who make up so much of the
membership of the Citibar-to negotiate around so many of our
profession's rules governing professional conduct. They assert these
rules are outdated, antiquated and unnecessary in this era of globegirdling law firms and sophisticated clients for whom the protections of
loyalty and confidentiality are simply annoying impediments to law firm
growth and prosperity that can and should be waived to accomplish
these desirable ends.
The opinion, however, is embarrassingly reasoned, premised on
many flawed principles, and represents an undermining of our
professional values. As a result, rather than provide a basis for the final
destruction of our basic ethical principles, one would hope the opinion
might provide a launching pad for a recapture of those values and their
celebration. This Essay will consider first the opinion's consideration of
two other related ethics issues, then the premises of the opinion's
centerpiece-a law firm representing each side of the same
transaction-and, finally, some thoughts on the role of in-house counsel
in all of this.

II. WE ARE TALKING ABOUT CONSENT
It is important to be careful about the topic of this opinion. The
Citibar Committee was not addressing when lawyers could take on
representations adverse to present or former clients without picking up
the telephone. This was not, at least frontally, an attack on our rules

8. Id.
9. Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. Comm. on Prof'l and Judicial Ethics, Formal Op.
2001-2 (2001) [hereinafter Formal Op. 2001-2], available at http://www.abcny.org/eth200l-02.html
(last visited Apr. 1, 2002).
10. Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
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governing imputation that require all lawyers in a practice setting to be
subject to the conflicts of all other lawyers in the same practice setting,"
a topic that has been a subject of much gnashing of teeth, particularly by
the New York mega-firms.'2 Nor did it dredge up the classic New York
argument that when a law firm represents a corporation it was perfectly
free, without client consent, to take positions directly adverse
to the
3
client.1
corporate
the
of
affiliate
or
subsidiary
parent,
corporate
Rather, this opinion asked the question of when a lawyer could call
up a client and seek the client's consent to the law firm taking on the
adverse representation, presumably on the understanding that the law
firm would abide the client's decision in that regard.'4 This inquiry
affects two different ethical issues. First, it raises the question of the
scope of nonwaivable conflicts. While lawyers are free to seek consent
from clients in a broad range of situations, there is a category of
representations that are nonwaivable, i.e., conflicted representations as to
which no reasonable lawyer would seek consent because the conflict is
such that the ensuing representation
cannot pass ethical muster,
5
regardless of the consent of the client.
Second, the Citibar opinion required one to consider what is the
meaning of consent, how informed and voluntary need it be and, in the
situation posited by the Citibar opinion, the role of in-house counsel in
the consent process. 6 Both of these ethical issues should be kept in mind
as the Citibar opinion is considered.
A.

Hypothetical# 1-PositionAdverse to Client in an
UnrelatedMatter

Part of the strength of any opinion must spring from the foundation
upon which it is built. Thus, the two situations first addressed by the
Citibar opinion as it leads up to the grand finale, must be scrutinized. In
11. Rule 1.10(a) of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, the general rule governing
imputed disqualification, provides: "While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall
knowingly represent a client when any one of them practicing alone would be prohibited from doing
so by Rules 1.7, 1.8(c) or 2.2." MODEL RuLES OFPROF'L CONDUCr R. 1.10(a) (2001).
12. See Sheila Birbaum, Address at Legal Ethics: The Core Issues, Hofstra University
School of Law (Mar. 11, 1996).
13. See, e.g., JPMorgan Chase Bank v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., No. 01 Civ. 11523, 2002 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 1201, at *7-9 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2002).
14. See Formal Op. 2001-2, supra note 9, at 2.
15. The recently amended Model Rules provide that no lawyer may seek consent to a conflict
unless "the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to provide competent and
diligent representation to each affected client." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 1.7(b)(1)
(2002), available at http:lvww.abanet.orglcpr/e2k-redline.doc (last visited Apr. 9, 2002).
16. See generally Formal Op. 2001-2, supranote 9.
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the first, the committee posits a hypothetical loan transaction between
Big Bank and ABC.' 7 Law firm currently represents ABC in product
liability lawsuits and the law firm wants to represent Big Bank on a loan
to ABC.'8 The opinion argues that the conflict should be easily waivable
because ABC will not care that the law firm is representing Big Bank
since it is in everyone's interest-Big Bank's and ABC's-to have ABC
successfully defend those lawsuits.' 9
That Big Bank and ABC have the same interest in having ABC's
liability on those mischievous lawsuits kept to a minimum is certainly
beyond dispute. But for the Citibar to end its analysis as to why this
conflict of interest can be easily waived by ABC with this one
proposition demonstrates the dangers for both client and lawyer inherent
in the conflict waiving process. If a sophisticated group of ethical gurus,
such as those who serve on the Citibar Committee, have so much trouble
appreciating the fragile ethical terrain they seek to traverse, one must
really wonder whether the average lawyer should be given so much free
rein in seeking client consent.
Just imagine that the conversation seeking ABC's waiver of the
conflict in law firm's representation of Big Bank is limited to: "You
have nothing to worry about, ABC. Your interests and Big Bank's vis-hvis these product liability claims are the same-you both want ABC to
get defense verdicts in every one of them. So we hope you will let us
represent Big Bank." Has anything been left unsaid?
The Citibar approach to this hypothetical ignores the issue of
confidential information entirely. While Big Bank may be rooting for
ABC, what if ABC ends up with more lawsuits? Or during one of the
existing lawsuits, law firm learns that ABC's exposure has changed
considerably? Or the product does have a defect? Or the judge warned
ABC it better settle quickly? Or the director of ABC's quality control
laboratory has a drinking problem? The list, of course, could go on, but
one need not belabor the point to demonstrate the predicament law
firm's waiver from ABC causes both law firm and ABC. There is, in
fact, a significant chance that there is a substantial relationship between
law firm's representation of ABC and its representation of Big Bank. It
is almost a given that law firm will learn confidential information from
ABC in the course of defending these suits that Big Bank would find of
more than passing, if not compelling interest; information that Big Bank

17. See id.
18. See id. at3.
19. Seeid. at9.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol30/iss3/5

4

Fox: Forgeddabout Conflicts - If Citibar Has Its Way, We Can Have Just
20021

FORGEDDABOUT CONFLICTS

might think must be reported20 and that might even result in an event of
default or other material event in the loan agreement. And all of that will
turn on how law firm represents Big Bank in the upcoming negotiations,
negotiations in which Big Bank will be seeking to expand ABC's
reporting obligations and its own protections regarding representations,
events of default, and the like. Indeed, curiously, law firm may actually
find itself, as it represents Big Bank, actually defining some of its own
future obligations as counsel to ABC in connection with these product
liability suits. Does ABC really want to consent to this representation by
its law firm adverse to ABC? It may be lulled into thinking so if the only
disclosure ABC receives is that which the Citibar opinion identifies. But
if, in fact, ABC is really warned of the potential conflicts discussed here,
one wonders whether the result will or should be the same.
Nor does the Citibar opinion even begin to suggest that there are
waiver issues for Big Bank. It assumes that Big Bank will be thrilled that
the law fimn it has hired to represent it in these loan negotiations will be
defending its customer ABC on these nagging product liability suits.2'
But Big Bank should consider at least two limitations on law firm's
undertaking this engagement. First, in negotiating for Big Bank, law
firm will certainly be in a very awkward position whenever the
negotiations address issues relating to contingent liabilities, reporting
requirements, and events of default. Second, if any due diligence must
be undertaken by Big Bank of the product liability predicament of ABC,
law firm will be disabled from participating in the process because of its
confidentiality obligations to ABC, obligations that ABC should not be
asked to waive merely to permit law firm to take on a representation
adverse to ABC.
The foregoing analysis does not mean that it would be impossible
to secure waivers from both ABC and Big Bank to permit law firm to
take on the new representation. Perhaps the products liability suits are a
flyspeck in the affairs of ABC or the loan to ABC is secured by assets
that will not be affected by possible devastating results in the lawsuits.
The only point I wish to make at this juncture is that the Citibar opinion
races ahead far too fast and in doing so ignores some very important
ethical considerations that a law firm that seeks to represent a new client
20. It is no solution to this ethical dilemma to argue that disclosure by ABC to Big Bank is a
matter of contract and therefore does not put the lawyer for ABC in a conflict situation. Issues
relating to disclosure are always subject to interpretation, the interests of ABC and Big Bank as to
any given disclosure are quite different and, therefore, the scope of the duty to disclose is likely to
be disputed.
21. See Formal Op. 2001-2, supranote 9, at 9.
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in a matter adverse to a present client must consider. Are the matters
really unrelated? Is confidential information implicated? Will the law
firm find itself in a position where it is conflicted or must pull its
punches? How does the representation affect each client? The Citibar
opinion did not ask, let alone answer, any of these questions, but the
conscientious lawyer must, and to the extent that this hypothetical was
posited to create a glide path to the ultimate conclusion of the Citibar's
opinion, perhaps that glide path is not quite so smooth as the Citibar
opinion would like a watching world to think.
The lapse by the Citibar Committee in this regard is quite
instructive. In my view, it is symptomatic of the problems inherent in a
law firm's seeking a waiver from a client which the law firm very much
wants to snare. Just as the Citibar Committee apparently ignored these
important issues because it so desired to construct a foundation for an
opinion approving consent by clients to a law firm representing both
sides of a transaction, so too might a law firm gloss over the intimidating
disclosures regarding the implications of a conflict in order to secure the
client's waiver.
B. Hypothetical # 2-Representing Client A and Client B on the
Same Transactionon "Unrelated" Matters
Before addressing the same law firm representing both sides of the
same transaction on all matters, the Citibar opinion addresses what it
considers a more benign example. In this one, law firm is representing
client A in negotiations adverse to B while at the same time representing
B on the antitrust issues that arise from the same transaction. 22 Think of
representing AT&T in its sale of its cable business to Comcast while
representing Comcast on issues raised by the Federal Communications
Commission.
The Citibar Committee concludes that this joint representation is
perfectly acceptable with client consent because these two
representations are "unrelated." Yet, if one thinks about it, it is hard to
imagine how this could ever be the case. This example, presumably
chosen with care by the Committee to demonstrate how benign such a
representation can be, in fact actually demonstrates the opposite.
Assume, without too great a reality leap, that on this hypothetical
transaction A is anxious to sell and its goal is to sell all of its assets. It
22. See id. at 10.
23. See id. (saying that mergers and acquisitions counsel has a different primary interest than
the antitrust counsel and, therefore, "informed client consent could be effective").
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wishes to seek an antitrust solution that will permit this goal to be
achieved, even if it requires litigation. Consider for a moment what
obligations the lawyer for A therefore has in terms of negotiating an
"antitrust out" clause in the sale or merger agreement.
Now look at the issues from the viewpoint of B. Assume its real
interest is in less than all the assets of A, that it would welcome some
limitation on what assets of A it might acquire. Or assume B needs this
transaction to close this year and it has no tolerance for protracted
antitrust litigation. The possibilities here are multiple and many more
could be imagined. But there is one alternative that is almost impossible
to imagine: that as to these antitrust issues the interests of A and B are
identical. And if they are not identical, how can law firm be representing
A in achieving its overall goals when it is representing B in achieving its
goals in this one critical area of the matter? As a result, if law firm is
undertaking any antitrust analysis or counseling on this transaction, one
would think it should be on behalf of A and consistent with A's goals,
whatever they might be.
In any event, the seeking of a waiver of this conflict would
certainly be a significant undertaking and one that would have to be
addressed with considerably more circumspection, thought and
discussion with both clients than is reflected in the Citibar opinion. First,
the law firm would have to ask itself if this is a road it wants to go down
at all. Here it is being hired to help A achieve a result: a sale of its assets
to B. The law firm knows A greatly desires this result, maybe even to the
point that the transaction is a necessity or otherwise A will go out of
business. Now in considering its representation of B on an antitrust
matter, law firm has to consider that the result of that work may be the
sabotaging or significant restructuring of the transaction to the
considerable detriment of A. That does not mean there could not be a
situation where the antitrust issues would not be that important or likely
to go to the heart of the transaction."4 But if they are, it is clear that this
may very well be a representation no reasonable lawyer would seek to
undertake, even if a waiver could be secured.
Any doubt on that score might be eliminated if one were to
consider the conversations law firm would have to conduct in order to
get informed consent from each client, conversations the Citibar opinion
does not even suggest are required. As to A, law firm would have to ask
if it could represent B on antitrust matters. First, the law firm would have
to explain how the firm planned to deal with the confidential information
24. But, of course, if that is the case, one must ask why would law firm go to all this trouble?
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of A. Is it not going to learn anything about the antitrust issues from A's
point of view? Is this going to force A to hire separate antitrust counsel?
How will that counsel deal with law firm when it comes to addressing
the antitrust issues in the agreement? Then law firm must explain the
possible effects on A of law firm's representation of B on antitrust
matters. "You recognize this work could end up thwarting this
transaction? Or demands from B that the transaction be restructured?
Or ... ?" Just these admonitions alone demonstrate why it would be a
nonstarter from A's perspective.
But B's position is equally problematic. "You understand that we
represent A and our firm's goal is to get the best deal for A and that,
consciously or subconsciously, that obligation may limit the advice we
would give you or the approaches we might recommend." Should B
really be asked to accept a representation that comes with these warts?
And even if asked, would any objective lawyer recommend that the
client choose this firm, no matter how great its antitrust expertise, to take
on this representation?
The foregoing is anything but an hysterical analysis of the situation
presented; rather it presents realistic possibilities of actual impediments
this hypothetical's simultaneous representation presents. Yet it stands in
stark contrast with the laissez-faire approach suggested by the Citibar
opinion which lackadaisically treats the undertaking of this antitrust
engagement as if it were a telephone call ordering in tuna fish
sandwiches.
C. Hypothetical # 3-The Dream: Representing Buyer and Seller
in a Wall Street Journal Page One Merger
Standing on the quicksand of its casual and flawed analysis of the
two earlier hypotheticals, the Citibar opinion reaches for the brass ring
when it opines that, with consent, the same law firm can represent both
buyer and seller, borrower and lender, and each merger partner, in a
major transaction.2' This opinion is not only built on an infirm analysis
of the two other situations, but on a number of other deeply misguided
notions as well.
First, there is the misguided notion that conflicts involving
transactional matters are somehow significantly different from conflicts
in litigation.26 But if you think about it for more than a minute, you

25.
26.

See Formal Op. 2001-2, supra note 9, at 4-5, 10.
See id.
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realize that the presence of a "v."' between the parties and the fact that
the clash takes place in a courtroom barely affects the conflict analysis.
The proponents of the proposition say that joint parties in a transaction
want to achieve a result-the purchase and sale of a company, the
lending and borrowing of money, the hiring of a key employee. But that
goal, even if it is mutual (and it really is not, since each party only wants
that result if it can get terms satisfactory to it) does not mask the fact that
every dollar in buyer's pocket is one less in seller's pocket; every
representation not made by seller is one less protection received by
buyer; every event of default insisted upon by lender is one more trap for
borrower. Needless to say, this list could go on and on.
The fact that transactions generally take place without raised
voices, and litigation often includes temper tantrums, does not change
the fact that from a conflict analysis point of view, the interests in a faceto-face transaction are just as directly adverse as they are in litigation.
Indeed, if one wished to push the proponent's analogy just a little
further, one could assert that the interests of the parties in litigation are
just like the interests of parties in transactions. The parties in litigation
wish to resolve their differences, they have a mutual interest in doing so,
they seek the solution in a process that is carefully orchestrated through
rules of procedure, and they more or less accept the result. But this
mutual interest in resolving the dispute, no more than the mutual interest
in achieving a sale or granting a loan, does not mask the adverse
interests at play.
Second, the authors of the opinion do not share with us how this
will work in practice. But a simple hypothetical I often use in class
should demonstrate the problem. I tell my students that two eager clients
appear before them, buyer and seller of a residential piece of real estate.
They tell the lawyer they have agreed on what is to be sold, when it is to
be sold, and the price at which it is to be sold. They ask the lawyer to
document the transaction. Can the lawyer do so? After I have convinced
at least one student that the lawyer can, I then add to the hypothetical the
question: What should the lawyer do when he realizes the parties have
not mentioned a termite clause? Suddenly the light bulb goes off and the
difficulties for the lawyer become apparent.
Now let us assume that lawyer A and lawyer B from the same law
firm are representing buyer and seller on the same transaction. Let us
assume buyer's lawyer draws up the first agreement and presents it to
seller's lawyer, his partner. Seller's lawyer notices there is no termite
27.

Or in New York, an "against."
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clause. Since he is representing seller, there is no capital in raising the
topic. But doesn't that lawyer for the seller have to worry about his own
malpractice liability when the buyer, who is also a client of the firm,
learns later that there is termite damage, that he could have been
protected with a termite clause, and that his lawyer never suggested one?
I do not think we need any more than this simple example to put a stake
in the heart of the idea that two lawyers from the same law firm could
represent buyer and seller in the same transaction.
Third, the Citibar opinion relies heavily, far too heavily, on what
they characterize as the sacred right of clients to request, no "insist," on
the right to be represented by the counsel of their choice. 28 Every time I
see those words, I wince because I know that "the right to counsel of
one's own choice" is the great shield behind which avaricious lawyers
seek to destroy the rules governing loyalty. It is never characterized as
lawyers being forced to turn down business; rather the proponents
describe the disappointed clients with tears in their eyes being forced to
pick a firm other than Skadden Arps 29 to represent them. But,
nonetheless, that is what motivates this idea: law firms not wanting to
turn away more business.
The opinion searches for support for this fundamental right of
clients to select counsel of their choice by relying upon Levine v.
Levine 3 But the truth is that our conflict rules cannot coexist with this
so-called "fundamental right., 3' Clients only have the right to secure
conflict-free representation; when the representation they seek creates a
conflict, that conflict must be waived, or the representation cannot go
forward.32 And if that representation involves a nonwaivable conflict,
then the client, no matter how bereft and down-at-the-heels, will have to
continue the search for alternative counsel, even if a conflict waiver
otherwise might be forthcoming.33
Fourth, the idea of the same law firm representing multiple parties
in a transaction clearly raises questions of confidentiality. Even the
Citibar recognizes this little problem. 3 However, they offer two
solutions. First, they, of course, seek refuge in the idea of screens.35 We
are going to screen team A, the team working for the buyers, from team
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

See Formal Op. 2001-2, supra note 9, at 9.
See Birnbaum, supranote 12.
436 N.E.2d 476,479 (N.Y. 1982).
See Formal Op. 2001-2, supra note 9, at 7.
See id. at 8.
See id. at 9.
See id. at 11-13.
See id. at 13.
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B, the team working for the seller. In fact they do not just call them
screens, they call them "firewalls 3 6 as if somehow, just like the
accountants who have enthusiastically adopted this wonderful term 37
something more substantial is in place when you say you have erected a
firewall instead of a screen.
The opinion asserts that maybe the two teams will be from different
departments in the law firm or different offices, and team A might not
even know the lawyers in that other department or other office who form
team B.3 ' But that is not what the law firms are selling their clients when
they tout their capabilities.39 All one need do is read the excerpt from the
web page of one of these law firms.
III. ACCESSIBLE EXPERTISE
When clients communicate with any lawyer in any one of our
offices-however large or small-they have access to our firmwide,
substantive breadth. Resources and experience that exist in a particular
office are available to clients worldwide.

...Each is different, yet each provides clients with access to the
firm's integrated legal servicesi °
For decades, the firm has "take[n] pride in our tradition of
teamwork."4' Lawyers at every level place top priority on responding to
calls for support from colleagues anywhere in the firm. 2 Every client
receives that "level of institutional support." 43
Such teamwork and service have been greatly enhanced by leadingedge communications technology. 44 Through telephone and computer
linkages, lawyers function with fully integrated efficiency. 45 Draft
36. See id at 5.
37. See, e.g., Kathryn A. Oberly, Vice Chair and General Counsel, Ernst & Young LLP, Oral
Remarks Before the ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice (Feb. 4, 1999), available at
http:llvwvw.abanet.orglcpr/oberly2.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2002).

38. See id.
39. See, e.g., Morgan Lewis, Counselors at Law, at http://www.morganlewis.com (last visited
Mar. 26, 2002).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See id.
43. Id.

44. See id
45. See id
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documents are exchanged instantly among practice groups and offices,
allowing interactions among lawyers whose skills create the best client
team.46
Since clients are free to waive the privilege under certain
circumstances, they also argue that there is no reason why clients cannot
agree to waive confidences in order to consent to a conflict.4 7 The
problem here is twofold. Is the client being asked to waive the conflict
for its benefit or for the benefit of an aggressive law firm that wants to
represent everyone? It is one thing for a client to be counseled to waive
the privilege for its own benefit; it is quite another to waive when the
benefits to the client are so dubious. Moreover, waiving the conflict and
agreeing to compromise confidences is an event that takes place at a
time when the client does not know what confidences will be shared.
Therefore, a prospective waiver of confidences should be no more
effective than an open-ended prospective waiver of a conflict of
interest,4 8 since neither is given with informed consent.
IV. THE DuBIous ROLE OF IN-HOUSE COUNSEL
Finally, the opinion relies very heavily on the notion that if clients
are represented by in-house counsel in this position, then everything
should be ethically acceptable. 49 This notion of in-house counsels'
blessing various waivers of the protections provided by the rules of
professional conduct has been around for some time. We have seen it in
the prospective waiver arena. ° We have seen it in the unreasonable fee
arena. Now we see it in the same-law-firm-representing-both-sides-of-atransaction arena. It is not clear to me upon what principle those
proponents rely. Are they saying that a client can properly assume more
risk if the client does so with the benefit of the advice of in-house
counsel? Or are they saying that the risk that the clients can be asked to
assume is the same but that the explanation that the client needs to
receive from outside counsel is less because the client is represented by
46. See id.
47. See Formal Op. 2001-2, supra note 9, at 4.
48. See generally Lawrence J. Fox, All's O.K. Between Consenting Adults: Enlightened Rule
on Privacy, Obscene Rule on Ethics, 29 HOFSTRA L. REv. 701 (2001).
49. See Formal Op. 2001-2, supra note 9, at 5.
50. See Fox, supra note 48, at 722 (noting that in many cases, in-house "counsel's presence
does not right the power or information imbalance between lawyer and client that the rules correctly
assume"). But see Jonathan J. Lerner, Honoring Choice by Consenting Adults: Prospective Conflict
Waivers as a Mature Solution to Ethical Gamesmanship-A Response to Mr. Fox, 29 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 971, 1010-11, 1011 n.157 (2001) (discussing corporations' increasing and "well-deserved"
reliance on in-house counsel for managing their legal matters).
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in-house counsel? It is my view that the same conflict should be
nonwaivable regardless of how sophisticated the client is and how many
other lawyers bless the nonwaivable conflict.
Far more important I think, we should be asking ourselves why we
are prepared to lapse into this regime where we allow in-house counsel
to bless items otherwise unblessible. Are not these in-house counsel
subject to our standards, don't these in-house counsel have an obligation
to apply those standards and when the in-house counsel fails to apply
those standards for whatever reasons, should we not say that the inhouse counsel has failed, rather than argue that the client is stuck with
the result?
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